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Philosophy of psychiatry faces a tough choice between two competing ways of under-
standing mental disorders. The folk psychology (FP) view puts our everyday normative 
conceptual scheme in the driver’s seat  –  on the assumption that it, and it only, tells 
us what mental disorders are (1). Opposing this, the scientific image (SI) view (2, 3) 
holds that our understanding of mental disorders must come, wholly and solely, from the 
sciences of the mind, unfettered by FP. This paper argues that the FP view is problematic 
because it is too limited: there is more to the mind than FP allows; hence, we must look 
beyond FP for properly deep and illuminating explanations of mental disorders. SI prom-
ises just this. But when cast in its standard cognitivist formulations, SI is unnecessarily 
and unjustifiably neurocentric. After rejecting both the FP view, in its pure form, and SI 
view, in its popular cognitivist renderings, this paper concludes that a more liberal version 
of SI can accommodate what is best in both views – once SI is so formulated and the 
FP view properly edited and significantly revised, the two views can be reconciled and 
combined to provide a sound philosophical basis for a future psychiatry.
Keywords: philosophy of mind, narrative therapy, cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy 
of cognitive science
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Hamlet Act I, Scene 5, 167–8
FOlK PsYchOlOgY rUles
How should we best understand, categorize, and treat mental disorders? A familiar answer in 
philosophical circles is that any approach to mental health must always operate with reference to 
the normative features that define our folk psychological (FP) understanding of mind. Call this 
the FP view of mental disorders and psychiatry. Its driving assumptions are that FP, and only FP, 
conceptually defines what it is to have a mind because FP, and FP alone, supplies the necessary and 
sufficient mark of the mental, emphasizing its essentially rational character. On the standard, narrow 
reading, FP plays this governing role precisely because it is understood to be the commonsense 
theory or conceptual scheme that reveals how mental states – typically assumed to be propositional 
attitudes – interact in the rational production of behavior and action.
Graham (1), a staunch spokesperson for the FP view, advances a theory of mental disorder accord-
ing to which we have no choice but to make reference to reason and rationality when understanding 
February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 122
Hutto A Reconciliation for the Future of Psychiatry
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org
such phenomena because such features “help to constitute and 
define distinctively mental activity such as believing, hoping, 
desiring, deciding, thinking and the like” [(1), p. 7].
The main idea behind this vision is that FP supplies the only 
normative standard of what minds are and how they operate. Hence, 
only against FP’s standard is it even possible to detect and demarcate 
mental disorders. Mental disorders arise when things go awry with 
us at some level, when in some important sense, a person fails to 
live up to or systematically violates the standards of rationality that 
characterize our everyday folk psychological ways of thinking. There 
may be various mental and non-mental causes of such failures. But, 
simply put, FP is the necessary reference point of what a normatively 
defined well-functioning mind looks like and what its rational 
characteristics are. Disordered minds, by comparison, are less than 
flourishing minds that fail to meet that normative standard.
Even though proponents of the FP view accept that perfect 
rationality is a notoriously slippery notion that evades precise 
analysis they insist, nonetheless, that, “rationality is essential to 
mindedness” [(1), p. 12]. Moreover, it is assumed that rational-
ity is only something exhibited by whole persons and not by the 
operations of their subpersonal parts. Putting all of this together, in 
standard formulations, the FP view holds that we have no choice but 
to understand minds by making use of FP concepts, which apply to 
persons whose intentional attitudes exhibit an inherent rationality.
Thinking of intentional attitudes (beliefs, desires, and so 
on) as presupposing the rationality of persons makes it 
clear that we persons are purposive or goal directed in 
behavior and that how we act or behave depends on our 
purposes or reasons for acting [(1), p. 120].
Graham (1) dubs this the rationality-in-intentionality (RIT) 
thesis for short. RIT takes rationality to be the hallmark of the 
mental  –  one that sets the mental forever apart from all other 
kinds of phenomena, and this is what makes the mental irreduc-
ibly autonomous.1 The autonomy of the mental thesis can be 
understood in more or less realistic terms. Yet in all versions the 
root idea, subscribed to by all fans of the FP view, is this: propo-
sitional attitudes can only be ascribed, or only have life, when 
they stand in appropriate kinds of holistically and normatively 
defined rational relations. Mental phenomena exist if and only if 
the relevant forms of rationality are in place: viz. they live in the 
space of reasons. This is allegedly why when rationality is absent, 
we must switch to another scheme for understanding the relevant 
phenomena; in such cases, a move to non-mental concepts and 
explanatory schemes becomes necessary precisely because minds, 
properly understood, are fading or absent.
The crucial assumption of the FP view is that it is the job of 
philosophy of mind to reveal and articulate the essential contours 
of our commonsense understanding of the mind  –  which are 
assumed to be the only bona fide conception of mind.2 The standard 
1 The FP view endorses the irreducibility claim about the mind, which Davidson 
championed long ago: “The reason mental concepts cannot be reduced to physical 
concepts is the normative character of mental concepts” [(4), p. 46].
2 Those who take the autonomy thesis seriously – whether in strongly realist or more 
interpretationist renderings – maintain that an FP understanding of mind plays an 
view is that this can only be achieved by means of some kind of 
conceptual analysis or radical interpretation [see, e.g., Ref. (5)].
With these assumptions about the essential characteristics of 
minds in place, the FP view of mental disorders firmly opposes 
what, by its lights, is its only possible rival, a scientifically orien-
tated, non-mentalistic FP-eliminativist approach – one that looks 
solely to neuroscience to discern “the best understanding of and 
treatment for mental disorder” [(1), p. 6]. A purely brain-based 
approach to mental disorders is oxymoronic from the perspective 
of those who hold that FP defines the mental; such an approach 
might tell us much about non-mental disorders of various kinds, 
but it could not be a starting point of inquiry into psychiatry 
because it misses out the mental altogether. Despite insisting on 
this point, fans of the FP view do not deny that neuroscience can 
play a part in the larger business of psychiatry. They do insist, 
however, that the part the brain sciences can play is always and 
everywhere secondary, servile, and subservient. Crucially, the 
FP view of psychiatry “does not relinquish the theory (of mental 
disorders) to, but deploys, brain science” [(1), p. 9].
Although clearly incompatible with a purely scientific, elimina-
tivist vision of psychiatry, the FP view is compatible with making 
explanatory use of a range of scientific findings. The sciences of the 
mind have something important to add to the story so long as they 
take their direction from FP when it comes to understanding and 
classifying mental disorders on the basis of possible causes. There 
is no contradiction to be found in such a cooperative enterprise for 
those who think FP defines the mind: but this is so only as long as 
it is accepted that FP must always remain in the driver’s seat when 
coordinating any such combined efforts [(1), p. 11].3
The logic is straightforward. Mental disorders  –  on the FP 
view  –  only ever show up as disturbances within the space of 
reasons. Even so, there can be non-mental causes of mental 
disorders. We can think of such causes as arational, non-mental 
disorder influences that, to use Graham’s apt phrase, “gum up” 
“the rational works” [(1), p. 160]. Non-mental factors – the influ-
ences of brain and behavior – can interfere with and upset our 
rationally constrained mentality. Accordingly, non-mental factors 
can contribute to and help explain the occurrence of mental disor-
ders – and this can happen even if the non-mental mechanisms in 
question are in perfect order and are operating just as they should.4
All in all, the FP view insists on a particular understanding of 
the explanatory relations that can hold between the mental and the 
absolutely essential role in defining what minds are and, hence derivatively, what 
mental disorders are. Accordingly, “the mind qua mind puts its inscription on the 
sources of a disorder. We cannot recognize a mental disorder without uncovering 
that mark” [(1), p. 11]. It is because of the need for benchmarking against the mark 
of the mental – which can only be done via FP – that “no conceptually regimented 
and normatively informed theory of mental disorder can be devised without taking 
philosophy of mind seriously” [(1), p. 1].
3 Thus in line with this, Graham (1) argues that going the FP-governed way ought 
not to encourage one to endorse the DSM atheoretical method of classifying and 
characterizing mental disorders.
4 For example, Graham (1) illustrates the latter point vividly by reminding us that, 
“an addict … does not possess a broken brain” (p. 179). The reason this can be so, 
Graham (1) claims, is because, “The brain, in general, is not hard-wired for per-
sonal prudence. Neural activity may systematically underwrite unwise behaviors 
without exemplifying a breakdown or something wrong or damaged in its wetware 
or machinery” (p. 178).
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non-mental when it comes to making sense of mental disorders. 
Neuroscience can help us to understand, for example, the condi-
tion of the unwilling addict because reference to brute arational 
neural mechanisms can help “to explain why addicts suffer from 
relapse in spite of themselves” [(1), p. 179, emphasis added]. Non-
mental mechanisms – whether malfunctioning or not – feature 
in the larger story of specific mental disorders because they may 
explain what interferes with the rational works. Telling the right 
story about such non-mental influences is complicated by the fact 
that there can be “different hypotheses about the irruptive role of 
a-rational neurobiological/neurochemical mechanisms into the 
space of reasons” [(1), p. 178].
Speaking on behalf of the FP vision of psychiatry, Graham (1) 
sees no difficulty in asserting that, “even though mental disorders 
are not brain disorders, neuroscience helps to illuminate their 
nature” [(1), p. 13, emphasis added]. How should we understand 
this claim? It deserves attention for, as just noted above, the 
FP view holds that the essence of mental disorders can only be 
understood with reference to what occurs in the space of reasons. 
Accordingly, explanations that cite non-mental goings-on from 
outside that space can only shine a light on the nature of mental 
disorders if we distinguish the essential characteristics of the latter 
from explanations that tell a fuller story about their actual natures 
(or, more likely, how non-mental mechanisms make an actual but 
effective difference in particular cases).
This requires drawing a distinction between the essence of 
mental disorders and their actual natures. A standard way to do 
this is to take a leaf out of the analytic playbook of commonsense 
functionalism (6–8). Analytic functionalists hold that our eve-
ryday folk theories or practices conceptually define what minds 
are, fully and completely. On this score, the so-called sciences of 
the mind reveal nothing about the essential features of minds. 
Prima facie, this may seem extreme. However, adopting this 
view is entirely compatible with the idea that the sciences can 
discover much about how mental phenomena are, as a matter 
of fact, instantiated in the actual world – hence, the sciences can 
discover much about their actual nature. They can do so once 
FP tells “empirical inquiry what to look for” [(2), p. 51]. If we 
distinguish the essential and actual characteristics of mental 
phenomena and, relatedly, mental disorders, it becomes possible 
to understand how the sciences can assist with an understanding 
of the nature of mental disorders on the FP view. Pace Locke, on 
this vision, it is the scientists of mind, not the philosophers of 
mind, who must do the under-laboring.
PsYchiaTrY in The scienTiFic iMage
The FP view of psychiatry has some fierce critics. It has been 
accused of presenting an unjustifiably restrictive vision of the role 
the sciences of mind play in mental health. Advancing the idea 
that psychiatry needs to be grounded entirely in the cognitive 
sciences, Murphy (2) is the foremost defender of the scientific 
image (SI) view of psychiatry. He and his friends see the FP view 
as unacceptable because it denies the sciences of the mind a free 
hand in revealing the essential character of mental phenomena. 
That restriction, SIers hold, results in an unwarranted fettering of 
psychiatric explanations and classifications [(2), p. 48, 51].
Adherents of the SI view are self-styled progressives. They 
insist that psychiatric explanation and nosology should not 
be regimented by, or beholden to, commonsense intuitions or 
assumptions. Psychiatric explanations, they hold, require no 
guidance, warrant, or mandate from FP. Proponents of the SI view 
insist that the future of the mental health field depends on fully 
embracing the sciences of the mind. The core assumption is that 
the sciences provide the requisite tools for a free inquiry into the 
nature of mental disorders. Moreover, the scientific work is to be 
conducted without requiring any appeal to commonsense notions 
of the mind, as filtered and understood through philosophy.
In place of the FP vision of psychopathology, Murphy (2) sets 
out his stall for a revisionary objectivism about the nature of 
mind. Accordingly, the bid is to discover what minds are through 
the development of a pragmatic and open-ended, scientifically 
driven conceptual framework, one that is revisable in practice and 
one that rests on testing out a series of empirical bets about men-
tal phenomena.5 Crucially, the scientific investigations Murphy 
envisages would not be shackled by FP’s oversight. On the SI 
vision, to truly explain and classify normal and abnormal minds, 
we must look to our best cognitive sciences and to those alone.6
An immediate consequence of embracing the SI view is that 
it open up the scope of what we might think of as the mental 
and how we might think of it, quite considerably. By implication, 
the same goes for mental disorders. For example, given that per-
ception is a paradigmatically mental phenomenon, it turns out 
that, on the SI view, blindness – however counterintuitive it may 
seem – counts not just as a disorder of the visual system but as a 
mental disorder [(2), p. 54, 55–57]. Murphy is happy to bite this 
and other, similar bullets. The justification is simple: violating a 
few folk intuitions is a small price to pay if going the purely SI way 
puts psychiatry on a “sounder footing” [(2), p. 11].
This is all very well and good as a sort of SI position statement 
but what justifies taking the SI path? Why suppose that SI might 
reveal new and deeper facts about how minds operate and how 
they can go wrong?7 Why not hold that the sciences of the mind 
do whatever good work they do by functioning in exactly the 
way the FP view says they do – viz. by supplying “the empirical 
application of our pre-theoretic folk concepts” [(2), p. 50]?
The most straightforward and compelling answer is that there 
is surely more to the mental than dreamed of by FP. This conclu-
sion is hard, if not impossible, to resist if FP characterizes the 
mental wholly in terms of the propositional attitudes and how 
5 In pressing for this future vision of mental health as wholly grounded in science, 
Murphy (2) laments that much contemporary psychiatry actively shies away from 
theory (as exemplified in the avowed theory-neutrality of the DSMs). Against the 
diagnostic descriptivism of the DSMs, he maintains that psychiatry must aim to 
find out how things “really are” with mental disorders and what underlies them. 
The only way psychiatry can do this, and thus secure its future, would be to take 
advantage of and actively contribute to developments in the cognitive sciences.
6 A psychiatry cast in the scientific image must assume that, “what counts as normal 
human nature is decided by a variety of disciplines that comprise the cognitive and 
biological sciences” [(2), p. 11].
7 Murphy (2) is certainly right that there is a real and urgent need for psychiatry to 
address the issues that lie at the heart of the debate between FP and SI views. For 
the troubling fact is that, “psychiatry as it stands is not a particularly mature or 
successful enterprise” [(2), p. 10].
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they rationally inter-relate. For on any such a rendering, there is 
every reason to believe that
mind has an existence and substantive character 
that goes well beyond, and is independent of our best 
common-sense interpretative practices. Hence know-
ing the truth about the mind requires a great deal more 
than informed reflection on those practices. In fact, it 
requires cognitive science [(9), xiv, emphases added].
A full understanding of all that is mental cannot be limited 
to FP characterizations alone. There are many aspects of 
mind – even quite ordinary, everyday ones – such as the com-
plex ways that perceiving and acting interact – upon which FP, 
as construed above, has simply nothing to say. Such examples 
multiply. There are many forms and aspects of mentality that 
can only be understood by engaging in modes of inquiry that 
go beyond interrogating FP as traditionally conceived. FP casts 
no light on the properties and dynamics of basic minds [for an 
extensive discussion, see Ref. (10)].
Call this the “More to the Mind than FP” objection. It strikes 
at the core assumptions of the official FP view. Notably, however, 
even if the “More to the Mind than FP” objection defeats or should 
make us suspicious about the FP view, it does not, by itself, justify 
adopting the pure SI vision. For even if there is “More to the Mind 
than FP,” it does not follow that our understanding of minds, and 
by implication mental disorders, can only and wholly be supplied 
by the sciences of the mind.
In the end, because FP is not the whole story about minds, 
it will be argued that going the SI way is best – but only if SI is 
carefully qualified. Why so? Because FP is part of the story of the 
mental: arguably, important aspects of human minds can only be 
understood in FP terms. This can be so even if FP assumptions 
about the mind should not be the basis for or otherwise restrict 
our investigations into the fundamental nature of minds. Before 
attempting to show how to marry these ideas in Section “Keeping 
FP in the Picture,” the next two sections raise important doubts 
about standard cognitivist formulations of the SI view and their 
inherent neurocentrism.
a cerTain irOnY
The SI view is open to understanding the mind in new ways 
that go beyond FP. Despite the essential openness of the SI view, 
some of its most prominent proponents have tried to foreclose 
on certain possibilities. Based on assumptions about what the 
best explanations in the cognitive sciences will look like, some 
campaign for a neuro-based cognitivist version of the SI view. For 
example, under SI’s auspices, Murphy offers a defense of the idea 
that, “psychiatry is a branch of medicine dedicated to uncovering 
the neurological basis of disease entities” [(2), p. 10, emphasis 
added].8 For him, going the SI way paves the way for adopting 
8 Murphy’s (2) defense is admittedly qualified because he admits there are limits to 
our understanding when it comes to naturalizing and mechanizing central reason-
ing processes such that it may turn out that a proper scientific understanding of the 
latter might never be attainable.
the medical model of psychiatry such that the work of psychiatry 
becomes that of tracing “abnormalities in behavior and cognition 
to specific causal factors that are realized in brain tissue” [(2), p. 
13, emphasis added].
In Murphy’s mind, adoption of the SI view leads naturally 
to firmly recommending a merger of psychiatry and clinical 
neuropsychology.9 He is supremely confident that a purely neuro-
based approach will dominate the future of psychiatry. This is 
evinced by his commitment to neurocomputationalism, input–
output functionalism, modules, and so on. But why assume that 
the brain’s the thing? Retort: Who seriously doubts it? Murphy tells 
us that, “After all, everyone knows that psychological phenomena, 
like all human behavior, are rooted in brain processes” [(2), p. 9, 
emphasis added]. How should we interpret the “everyone knows 
that” operator in this statement and what epistemic backing does 
it have? There are several possibilities.
The first is to go “Folk Analytic.” Perhaps we can appeal to 
folk intuitions about the mind to justify talk about what everyone 
knows about the brain basis of minds. Clearly, this is a non-starter 
for SIers. The SI view precludes making any appeal to hypoth-
esized folk theories and the intuitions they sponsor in order to 
explain the epistemic credentials of “everyone knows” talk. Folk 
intuitions can give no backing to SI friendly claims about what 
everyone knows; hence, they cannot help justify the claim that 
cognition is wholly caused by and realized in the brain as opposed 
to having a wider and non-exclusively neural basis. Put simply, 
to adopt the SI view of psychiatry is to forego making appeals to 
folk intuitions in order to defend claims about “what everyone 
knows” about the mental. Call that Murphy’s Law. Murphy too 
must abide by it.
The second way to go might be to appeal to consensus in this 
matter in the philosophy of cognitive science. Classical cognitivist 
approaches to cognition promote a brainbound account of cogni-
tive processes by adopting a representationalist and internalist 
account of the vehicles of cognition. If everyone in the field agrees 
that cognition is always and everywhere content involving and 
that the vehicles of mental content are neural, then this would 
justify claiming that “everyone knows” neurocentrism to be 
true. The best cognitive explanations of behavior can, in effect, 
“throw away the world” and focus solely, and solipsistically, on the 
properties that supervene on the current internal neural states of 
cognizers (11–14).
SIers would be justified in saying that psychiatry ought to take 
an exclusive interest in brains if classical cognitivism were true. 
The trouble, for Murphy and followers, is that classical cognitiv-
ism may not be true, and – as things stand – it is far from a safe 
bet to assume that it is. More to the point, looking at the state of 
the philosophy of cognitive science, it can be safely said that clas-
sical cognitivism is not known to be true. There are deep-seated, 
9 Such a merger, he holds, is “necessary to develop the broadest and most fertile 
approach to understanding psychopathology” [(2), p. 12]. In saying this, he does 
not promote a crude reductionism. He does not assume that neuropsychology 
offers molecular explanations or that its explanations are somehow more funda-
mental. Nevertheless, he holds, neuropsychological explanations have a privileged 
status: they provide a special understanding that affords unique possibilities for 
intervening upon and treating mental disorders.
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on-going philosophical debates about the character of cognition 
and the reach of cognitive processes – and these debates are far 
from being conclusively settled.
Murphy is well aware of these debates and their import. His 
official word on the matter in 2006 was to note that, “Some 
pictures of the mind stress embodiment very heavily … Others 
prescind from details of our embodiment to stress a more purely 
computational theory of the mental … what counts as the mental 
depends in part on who is right in these debates” [(2), p. 64]. 
Despite this acknowledgment, Murphy thinks there is really no 
doubt that the sciences of mind will stick to providing explana-
tions in terms of brain-based, semantic representations. This he 
takes to be a settled issue – even if, in the end, the hypothesized 
brain-based representations in question turn out not to have 
contentful properties of the FP sort.10
However, what exactly are the defining properties of represen-
tations, as defined solely by the sciences of the mind, without any 
reference to the kinds of content understood by FP? How should 
we understand the disagreements between representationalist 
and non-representationalist if we do not appeal to some notion 
of content as supplied by FP or some other agreed upon non-FP 
theory (15)? And without agreement about the defining proper-
ties of representations understood in non-FP terms  –  which 
might be supplied if we had a well-developed non-FP theory of 
content – how are we to decide where the boundaries of mind 
and cognition lie? How are we to determine whether  –  in the 
end – the best explanations of sciences of the mind will be given in 
terms of “inputs” and “outputs” that are purely neural as opposed 
to involving extraneural factors too (16)?
Against this backdrop, Murphy’s confidence in an exclusively 
representationalist and neuro-focused future for psychiatry will 
seem, at best, premature – and at worst, it will look like a ground-
less pledge of allegiance. For the fact is there is no agreement in 
the philosophy of cognitive science that supports the idea that 
everyone knows – at least, not yet – that psychological phenom-
ena are rooted or realized exclusively in brain processes.
But wait. Surely, we are looking for consensus in the wrong 
place. The fact that philosophers  –  of the mind or other-
wise – disagree about important topics is hardly news. Perhaps 
there is yet another, more properly scientific consensus that we 
can appeal to in order to make good on the “everyone knows” 
claim. Doesn’t a quick glance at the current agreement in the 
theoretical commitments of actual scientists of the mind secure 
its truth? The great bulk of scientists of the mind do talk of neural 
and mental representations in free and easy ways these days. Does 
it follow that they are committed to a cognitivist take on mental 
representations of the sort described above  –  one that would 
10 Thus, in a forthcoming paper, Murphy writes, “The question whether science 
makes use of representational systems isn’t really open to doubt any longer: many 
areas of psychology and neuroscience take for granted the existence of semantic 
interpretations of internal states of some cognitive system. The assumption that 
inputs and outputs to and from components of the brain represent distal features 
of the world has been part of neuroscience since the nineteenth century. What is 
open to doubt is whether representation, as used in the sciences of mind, has the 
properties that philosophers have found in intentional content, as presupposed by 
folk psychology. I am not taking a stand on that … ” (Murphy D. Brains and Beliefs 
(Unpublished)).
justify neurocentrism? Establishing that would require serious 
and detailed interpretative work: it would need to be shown that 
the representational talk of scientists has all of the relevant com-
mitments and that it is more than nominally unified. It is far from 
obvious that this is the case. One major problem is that no unified 
theory of representation currently exists. Worse still, if we look at 
the current state of cognitive science there does not seem to be a 
single, settled story to tell about which theoretical tools – repre-
sentational or non-representational – are primary or the best ones 
to use when it comes to understanding cognition and explaining 
intelligent activity. We seem to be living in a mixed economy. If 
this is right, then there is not an existing scientific consensus SIers 
can point to in order to justify the claim that “everyone knows” 
cognition to be brainbound.
On top of this, even if such a current consensus did exist – even 
if all good cognitive scientists turned out to be representationalists 
in the relevant sense – more work would be needed in order to 
determine whether the entities and properties they posit now will 
stand the test of time. It is always possible that even if all cogni-
tive scientists are currently committed to neural representations 
still, it might turn out that something with different properties 
will best explain the relevant phenomena. Cognitive science is, 
after all, an unfinished business. Hence, even if today’s scientists 
did have common commitments that would justify adopting 
neurocentrism, we might still worry that any such contingent 
fact would not provide a secure basis for making firm predictions 
about the future of psychiatry. The official story is that not long 
ago cognitivism replaced old school behaviorism, right? Science is 
shifty – but in a good way. The SI view should surely embrace that.
At this stage of the game, there seems to be no obvious justifica-
tion for fans of the SI view to reject the idea that psychiatry might 
look beyond the brain when it comes to understanding, explain-
ing, and treating psychopathological disorders. Indeed, there are 
positive reasons for thinking that it is fruitful to look beyond the 
brain when it comes to understanding mental phenomena (16). 
Notably, since looking beyond the brain does not entail ignoring 
the brain, adopting such a liberal SI view is perfectly in line with a 
modified version of Murphy’s assertion that “we are animals with 
a biology including a brain that is [part of] the foundation of our 
mental life” [(2), p. 10].
Still, it might be thought that the foregoing liberal assess-
ment is too blithe, quick, and programmatic. Aren’t there good 
grounds for thinking that cognitive science will remain deeply 
committed to cognitivism and neurocentrism, even if in the final 
reckoning, it deviates in some matters of detail from the classical 
versions of those views? Aren’t there special reasons for favoring 
cognitivism – reasons that we can identify here and now – that 
would justify neurocentrism and thus rule out more radical and 
extensive possibilities for understanding the nature and extent of 
cognition. That seems to be the line of several prominent defend-
ers of cognitivist variants of the SI view (2, 3).
cOgniTiVe BriDge WOrK?
In defending their predictions about the rightful dominance of 
an SI-based medical model, Murphy and Smart (17) make it 
clear that this future is to be secured by cognitive neuroscience 
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and not merely some brutal brain science. What makes cognitive 
neuroscience special, they maintain, is that it posits subpersonal 
information-processing mechanisms that are at once both 
causal–mechanical and intentional in character. It is because it 
blends the cognitive with the neural that cognitive neuroscience 
has unique explanatory power: it, alone, allows for an integrated 
scientific story to be told about minds.
Looking exclusively at what goes on in brains is apparently 
justified because of the depth and unity cognitive neuroscientific 
explanations can provide. Gerrans (3) makes this case in great 
detail.11 He argues that cognitive neuroscience understands, 
“persons as complex, hierarchically-organized information-
processing systems implemented in neural wetware” [(3), p. 
16].12 Seeing persons as brain based, in turn, allegedly confers 
peculiar advantages because it puts us in a position, for example, 
to “show how facts identified and explained by disciplines operat-
ing at ‘levels’ such as molecular neurobiology or neuroanatomy 
can explain psychological and phenomenological level facts that 
give delusion its clinical profile” [(3), p. 20, emphases added].13 
What makes having a cognitive theory pitched at the subpersonal 
information-processing level so uniquely valuable is that it is 
needed to “bridge the gap between neurobiological and personal 
level explanation” [(3), p. 21, emphasis added].
Integrated explanations of the promised kind are said to 
be unavailable, in principle, to the isolationist FP view: this is 
precisely because to adopt the latter’s “space of reasons” idea 
enforces an absolute distinction between the intentional and the 
mechanical.
To see what makes cognitive theory so appealing, it is worth 
getting clear about what exactly the FP view allegedly cannot do. 
Gerrans (3) accuses its proponents of operating with a disunified 
framework – one in which mechanisms are assumed to make only 
a causal difference to cognitive goings-on in a way that debars 
them from being properly explanatory (p. 15, 20). For example, 
Gerrans characterizes the FP view as being committed to the idea 
that organic damage might “play a causal role in introducing the 
drastic change in psychological structure but plays no explanatory 
role” [(3), p. 27, emphases added]. Does it make sense to think the 
explanatory space could carve up in the way Gerrans suggests? 
11 Gerrans (3) follows Murphy’s lead of treating the SI view as best seen through the 
lens of a “minimalist cognitivism” (p. 18). Like Murphy, he sees that the future of 
mental health resides with brain sciences of the cognitive variety. He too regards 
psychiatry “as a branch of cognitive neuroscience by employing cognitive models 
that do not abstract away from, but are sensitive to, details of neural implementa-
tion” [(3), p. 37].
12 On this vision, “personhood is a cognitive phenomenon constituted by the fact 
that personal-level phenomena, such as feelings, beliefs, emotions and desires 
arise at the highest levels of a cognitive processing hierarchy whose nature can 
be described and explained” [(3), p. 21]. Human cognition is thus “a complex 
hierarchy of computational processes performed by neural circuitry” [(3), p. 30].
13 Motivating this proposal, with a Parthian shot at the perceived limits of the 
FP view, Gerrans (3) stresses that, “collecting and collating correlations between 
neural, phenomenological and cognitive properties of the delusional mind is useful 
but we need a theoretical approach that fits all this information together” (p. 14). It is 
here that we meet the idea that the tools of cognitive neuroscience are uniquely well 
suited to integrating “evidence from different disciplines about the way the mind 
configures itself in response to incoming information according to the way neural 
mechanisms influence cognitive processing” [(3), p. 14].
Can we distinguish between something’s playing a merely causal 
versus a properly explanatory role? How should we understand 
this distinction?
As discussed in Section “Folk Psychology Rules,” proponents of 
the FP view clearly allow that mental phenomena can be explained 
by what goes on in non-mental mechanisms. The FP view may be 
limited in that it is not interested in, or simply fails to provide, 
very detailed stories about the non-mental causal contributions 
of implementation mechanisms in information-processing terms. 
But it cannot be faulted for ruling out, or making it impossible to 
tell, such deeper explanatory stories. So this alone cannot be what 
makes its rival, the cognitivist view, special.14
Apparently, what makes cognitive theory special is that it 
brings something else – something quite unique – to the table. 
It regards the mind as a complex information-processing sys-
tem – one that is organized in a hierarchical way, with a variety 
of interacting processes playing specific roles and where some 
of these diverse processes are responsible for the supervision of 
others in the system. Understanding the mind through the lens of 
cognitive theory allegedly provides a peculiar sort of intelligibil-
ity – one that allows theorists to go beyond the telling of merely 
“difference making” causal stories. The cognitive theory allows us 
to see how everything fits together in a systematic way; it bridges 
the gaps and enables explanations at many different scales and 
levels to be integrated by detailing how information flows from 
level to level and what role particular processes play in the wider 
cognitive economy [(3), p. 48, see also 32, 53, 79, 103].
From this vantage point, it is easy to see the attraction of hav-
ing a broader vision of the mind that seeks to understand the 
roles played by various forms of cognitive activity, how various 
aspects of mind relate to and interact with one another, and how 
specific disturbances in those relations and interactions can lead 
to mental disorders with signature profiles.
This much is welcome. Yet friends of cognitivist SI, such 
as Gerrans (3), go further than this: they suggest that only 
cognitive neuroscience has what it takes to do the required 
integrating work. As Gerrans (3) says, “the essential idea of 
cognitive neuropsychiatry is that without a cognitive theory 
the problem identified by autonomy theorists  …  cannot be 
14 There is great potential for confusion and conflation about just what the FP 
view and cognitive theory might, respectively, have to offer in terms of deeper 
explanations. As Section “Folk Psychology Rules” made clear, the FP view allows 
that we can go to a different level of description in order to get deeper explana-
tions of mental disorders. Remarkably, in some places, Gerrans (3) talks in ways 
that suggest cognitive theory is wholly at peace with the FP view’s suggestion 
that underlying neural mechanisms only ever explain by describing implement-
ing mechanisms of cognitive phenomena. As he writes: “It is normal practice to 
explain phenomena such as amnesia or macular degeneration in terms of the way 
neural circuits implement the cognitive processes involved in memory or perception. 
This suggests that the way to explain psychology and phenomenology in terms of 
neurobiology is via a cognitive theory” [(3), p. 15, emphasis added]. If this were 
the whole story, it would be hard to distinguish what cognitive theory could offer 
that is really different from what the FP view offers. Yet, there are reasons to think 
this is neither the whole story about what cognitive theory has to offer nor the right 
one. In an unpublished paper, Murphy (forthcoming) upbraids Gerrans for talking 
about explanations of mental disorders by appeal to implementation mechanisms. 
By Murphy’s lights, such talk is just an unfortunate hangover of the philosophical 
tendency to mix up analytic functionalism with cognitive psychology.
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solved. The gap between neurobiology and psychology will be 
unbridgeable” [(3), p. 36]. Hence, “there must be an explanatory 
relationship between neuroscience and folk psychology” [(3), 
p. 33, emphasis added]. These are very strong, philosophically 
“musty” claims – and they are not self-evidently true.15 We might 
well doubt that cognitive neuroscience per se is best placed to 
provide the desired integrating theoretical vision, especially in 
light of the concerns raised about Murphy’s neurocentrism in 
the previous section.
What might persuade us that a brain-based cognitive theory 
is necessary to bridge the putative gaps? Allegedly, that cognitive 
neuroscience supplies special means for understanding the links 
between various mental phenomena. It can do so, again allegedly, 
precisely because it endorses a vision of the neurally housed mind 
“organised as a hierarchical system … which uses representations 
of the world and its own states to control behaviour” [(3), p. 47, 
emphasis added]. The claim is that cognitive theory posits neural 
representations that perform a variety of cognitive tasks and 
that once we understand how information flows between such 
representations, we will be in a position to provide complete 
and satisfying explanations of mental disorders in ways which 
make the links between subpersonal to personal-level cogni-
tive phenomena intelligible. Thus, Gerrans (3) observes of this 
general strategy that, ultimately, supplying the correct account 
of what drives specific delusions requires accounting for “the 
way the brain encodes information acquired in experience and 
then reconstructs representations of that information when 
subsequently cued” (p. 33).
It seems that the central posits of cognitive theory – informa-
tion and representation  –  provide the perfect theoretical glue 
for integrated explanations. Cognitive neuroscience promises 
to show how there can be relevant connections between various 
cognitive activities in a way that does not just cite correlations 
or brute causal relations. Instead, cognitive neuroscience alone 
proves to be genuinely explanatory of mental disorders because 
it alone makes intelligible multilevel interactions across various 
scales and levels.
Allegedly, cognitive neuroscience alone can achieve this 
feat because it is wedded to a representational theory of mind 
that assumes cognition to be at root both mechanical and 
intentional. Importantly, cognitive theory seems to provide us 
a new mark of the mental – not “rationality-in-intentionality” 
15 For example, elsewhere, Gerrans speaks of the “necessary role of cognitive theory 
in linking the neurobiological and phenomenological levels of explanation” [(3), 
p. 18, emphasis added]. Methodologically speaking, it is strange that Gerrans (3) 
makes appeal to such general and wholesale philosophical justifications, for when 
pinning his philosophical colors to the mast he clearly tells us that: “Murphy is 
right. Our best understanding of the mind comes from understanding cognitive 
architecture. However that argument cannot be established a priori for all mental 
phenomena. The best we can do is construct, revise and, ultimately, unify case-by-
case explanations” [(3), p. 14, emphases added]. This fits better with his more retail 
defenses of cognitive theory, such as when he claims that the “cognitive theory of 
visuo-motor control embedded in the overall architecture of cognitive control … is 
required to explain why high levels of activity in these regions produce loss of a 
sense of agency” [(3), p. 18, emphasis added], or when he tells us that “schizo-
phrenic symptoms can only be explained in representational terms” [(3), p. 18].
cast as person-level phenomena, to be sure. Instead it offers us 
a “content-in-intentionality” or CIT mark of the mental.16 For 
those who accept something like CIT, even though the cognitive 
is regarded as quite a mixed bag that reaches across the so-called 
subpersonal and personal levels it is also united by the intel-
ligible relations that are instantiated through the processing of 
informational and representational content in ways that define 
minds.
Some philosophers hold that cognitive scientists are commit-
ted to essentially characterizing minds in information-processing 
terms. This is, of course, not news. We frequently hear that
cognitive science … has as its subject matter capacities 
like memory, perception, attention, language processing 
and reasoning. The concepts that cognitive sciences take 
to be essential for understanding their domain include 
information, representations, and algorithms [(19),  
p. 74, emphasis added].
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Shapiro (19) is 
right in thinking that working cognitive scientists take themselves 
to use and need these kinds of conceptual tools. Would this help 
fans of the cognitivist SI view to justify the claim that cognitive 
neuroscience operates with unique explanatory tools that give it 
special gap-closing powers?
Would assuming CIT make cognitive neuroscience ideally 
well placed to provide gap-bridging solutions? One reason for 
thinking so is that CIT seems to imply the existence of something 
like a neurally based space of reasons. To posit a space of reasons 
mark II would be to assume that there exists a cognitive level at 
which various mental phenomena do not just brutally interact 
but intelligibly inter-relate because they communicate by traf-
ficking in contentful information and representations. Content 
would, on this picture, be the shared common coin traded by all 
cognitive phenomena. The CIT picture seems to make it possible 
to understand cognitive relations in explanatorily illuminating 
ways that do not reduce to the giving of merely brutal, causal 
explanations.
Let us imagine that cognitive neuroscience posits a neural 
space of reasons, ala CIT, and embraces internalism about the 
vehicles of various mental contents. If so (assuming the above 
analysis is correct), it would follow that cognitive neuroscience 
would have utterly special resources for bridging the sort of gaps 
of which Gerrans (3) speaks. All that would have to be done 
to seal the deal would be to show in detail how the cognitive 
neuroscience, as imagined above, could use those resources to in 
fact close such gaps. Doing all of this would be an effective way 
of motivating an exclusively neurocentric version of the SI view.
Before assessing whether cognitive neuroscience, so con-
strued, really has what it takes to close the said gaps, it is important 
16 A CIT, intentionality-in-mechanism vision of the cognitive, is clearly in tune with 
the idea that, “The whole thrust of cognitive science is that there are sub-personal 
contents and sub-personal operations that are truly cognitive in the sense that these 
operations can be properly explained only in terms of these contents” [(18), p. 27, 
emphasis added].
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to be clear about the source of the alleged need to do so. Notably, 
if there are any such explanatory gaps to bridge, then the need to 
bridge them is motivated by purely philosophical, not scientific, 
considerations. Without doubt, scientists and psychiatrists seek 
rich explanations of the roots of mental disorders. Providing such 
explanations would require going beyond FP and delving deeply 
into the sciences of the mind. However, crucially, providing such 
explanations is not the same as, nor does it require, bridging 
the putative intelligibility gaps –  those that hold, e.g., between 
neurobiology and folk psychology and with which Gerrans (3) 
is concerned. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that Gerrans (3) 
seeks to motivate an exclusively cognitive neuroscientific take on 
SI by getting us to take seriously the need to address explanatory 
requirements of a distinctively philosophical kind.
The great irony is that elsewhere SIers reject the need to 
address such intelligibility demands as illegitimate. Compare the 
alleged need to make sense of the interactions between cognitive 
phenomena across levels by appeal to representational contents 
with the alleged need to make sense of the connections that hold 
between propositional attitudes in terms of rationality. If Gerrans 
(3) is right, cognitive theory can help us to make intelligible how 
various subpersonal cognitive phenomena inter-relate. How 
might it do this? By rendering the relations between cognitive 
phenomena intelligible. How? Not in RIT terms that explain 
how personal-level propositional attitudes relate rationally, to be 
sure, but in CIT terms that explain how neural representations 
relate contentfully.
It should now be easy to see why it would be a problem for 
SIers to advance this type of line. Any attempt to motivate a neu-
rocentric cognitivist SI view by arguing that cognitive neurosci-
ence alone can bridge otherwise unintelligible explanatory gaps 
requires being sensitive to the very sort of philosophical concerns 
that the SI view itself casts into doubt. Must there be some com-
mon feature (if not rationality then content) that is shared by all 
mental phenomena and which unifies them and explains how 
they intelligibly inter-relate? SIers say “No”: They question the 
demand that “personal-level phenomena can only be explained 
in terms of other personal-level phenomena” [(3), p. 21]. This 
being the case, surely, we are also well within our rights to ques-
tion whether there is a legitimate need for a unifying cognitive 
theory that makes intelligible how various cognitive phenomena 
intelligibly inter-relate in special, more-than-merely causal ways. 
As the old proverb reminds us, what’s sauce for the goose is sauce 
for the gander.
And there is something else to consider. We might doubt 
that on close scrutiny appeals to information and representation 
could play the unifying and integrating roles that would satisfy 
the identified gap-bridging needs, if we were to take such needs 
seriously. The fact is that apart from bearing the names “cogni-
tive,” “representational,” or “informational” nothing in so-called 
current cognitive theory deeply unifies all the various cognitive 
phenomena in terms of their importantly and interestingly 
diverse properties or roles.
Consider Gerran’s claim that, “a scientist explaining some 
discrepant evidence is doing the same thing as the oculomotor 
system controlling the trajectory of a limb” [(3), pp. 46–7, 
emphasis added]. Is this credible? Undoubtedly, there may be 
some mileage in taking this route and drawing loose analo-
gies for certain purposes. But a developed theory would be 
needed to back up any such claim if taken in a serious and 
literal way.17
To illustrate the point consider what Gerrans (3) has to say 
about the activation-information-mode (AIM) model of dream-
ing, which focuses on the flow of information within and between 
components of a control hierarchy. In discussing that model, he 
holds that the “intrinsic cognitive properties of these components 
are preserved through transitions from mode to mode. What 
changes are the interactions between these components” [(3), p. 
79, emphases added].
Usually, in this sort of context, cognitive theorists upgrade talk 
of the flow of information to talk of the flow of informational con-
tent. Content, they hold, is what survives changes in mode and 
process. Canonically, the content of a mental state is determined 
by what it is about and how it represents the world to be. Now, if 
information processing literally involves the trading of contents 
that would make it easier to justify claiming that scientists and 
information-processing systems basically do the same cognitive 
work. Moreover, if content were the common coin that is always 
traded in some form, everywhere in the cognitive economy, it 
would be clear why there would have to be, and how there could 
be, intelligible relations holding between the many and various 
cognitive phenomena.
The trouble with this gambit is that it raises a host of unan-
swered questions. Just what is informational content anyway? 
What intrinsic cognitive properties does it have? Where does it 
get them? How can content be preserved through changes? How 
can it make a difference to cognition? How does it relate to rep-
resentational content? Is it a kind of objective commodity? Does 
it make sense to say that we can take different perspectives – e.g., 
subjective and objective  –  toward it [as Ref. (3) appears to 
assume – see, e.g., p. 17]?
Cognitive theorists can avoid these tricky questions by 
sticking to an understanding of information in scientifically 
17 In the text surrounding this claim, Gerrans (3) makes clear that he is drawing 
on assumptions that predictive coding accounts of perception have made popular 
to support the idea that visual systems and scientists “do essentially the same 
thing.” Predictive coding accounts understand cognition as a matter of making 
active inferences in continuous effort to minimize prediction error. But whether 
we should think of visual systems as really making contentful inferences at all, 
and whether if they do, they do so in anything like the way that scientists do, are 
highly contentious topics of current debate [for reasons why we ought to prefer 
a non-contentful reading of predictive processing, see Ref. (20, 21)]. For this 
reason, it might seem safer for cognitivists to advance a weaker claim about what 
makes these phenomena essentially the same. It might be argued that scientists 
and visual systems are essentially alike because they both use representations even 
though visual systems use different kinds of representation than scientists do. The 
idea here is that there is no requirement that visual systems and scientists need 
to operate with the same kinds of content in order to qualify as representational 
systems. While it is technically correct to go this way it raises afresh the question 
of what unifies and intelligibly relates these two cognitive phenomena if not the 
fact that they both involve manipulations of content of the same kind. The point is 
that without full details, it is far from clear why we should accept that vision and 
scientific theorizing – which appear to be quite disparate cognitive activities – are 
essentially alike.
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respectable terms  –  those of covariance and correspondence. 
That is perfectly fine, but then it is difficult to justify claims that 
basic information processing is content involving in a way, which 
would license drawing a strong analogy with the theoretical 
activity of scientists.
This is just one example of a disunity objection to the inte-
grationist picture. To make a full dress case against such a vision 
would require a much longer discussion [(10), esp. ch. 4]. For our 
purposes, it suffices to note that anyone offering a bridge build-
ing, unifying cognitive theory must answer the sorts of questions 
raised above. Prima facie, it seems they will only be able to do 
so with the backing of a well-developed naturalistic theory of 
content.
To highlight why such a theory is needed, consider a different 
set of cases. In many of the explanations that Gerrans (3) offers of 
delusions the “felt” aspect of the phenomenon in question turns 
out to be a pivotal factor. The phenomenological and emotionally 
charged aspects of our experience apparently matter to and help 
explain some of the strong tendencies we have when respond-
ing to, interpreting, and accounting for our situations. Yet, as is 
notoriously well known, we currently lack anything like a work-
able theory that shows how we are to understand such qualitative 
phenomena in purely information processing or representational 
terms. Once again, it looks like disunity rather than unity is the 
word of the day.
Things are even more puzzling if we consider the roles 
imaginings are meant to play in the integrative explanations on 
offer by cognitive theorists, such as Gerrans (3). For example, he 
holds that simulative activity generates imaginings that can be 
incorporated in a wider cognitive economy. By this, he means 
that imaginings can be the basis for action (including mental 
action). Despite the fact that imaginings are influential and we 
often act on them, they are cognitively interesting and distinct 
because they lack many of the properties of canonical proposi-
tional attitudes, such as belief [(3), p. 18].
On this score Gerrans (3) tells us that
Imagination uses the mind’s cognitive resources, such 
as perceptual, doxastic and emotional processing to 
create simulations. It thus inherits the intentional 
structure of these counterpart processes. However qua 
simulations imaginative states do not have congruence 
conditions. [(3), p. 105].
The basic claim, which is plausible enough is that imagination 
deploys specialized neural circuitry to “construct and manipulate 
representations which have representational contents but no con-
gruence conditions” [(3), p. 114, emphasis added]. Gerrans (3) is 
concerned to show that simulative imagining can figure in and 
make a difference to one’s thinking without the content of such 
imaginings being believed.
Yet, since most theorists hold that mental content requires 
some kind of correctness or congruence condition, it is puz-
zling in what sense imaginations can be said to have representa-
tional content if they lack such conditions altogether in the way 
Gerrans (3) proposes. What remains if you subtract congruence 
conditions from a mental representation? Gerrans’s (3) answer 
is intentional structure. But it is not clear what exactly puts the 
intentionality in this structure for cognitivists if not the exist-
ence of mental representations with congruence conditions.18
Let us be clear. A simulative account of imaginings is attractive 
for many reasons [(23), ch. 4]. However, it is far from clear that 
imaginings without congruence conditions are best understood 
as any kind of mental representation for precisely the reasons 
stated above (20, 22). But even if this proves possible it would 
remain unclear how a simulative account of the imagination that 
emphasized the lack of congruence conditions could contribute 
to a unified cognitive theory of minds.
Our capacity for producing narratives – often quite spectacular 
ones – is yet another place in which it is important to recognize 
that interesting forms of cognition have special properties that 
break the standard representationalist mold. Gerrans (3) proposes 
that particular forms of delusional thinking arise from signature 
breakdowns in the usual interactions between cognitive systems. 
These breakdowns in turn prompt patterns of default thinking 
that take the form of experientially charged imaginative episodes. 
Default thoughts of this stripe provide raw material that can be 
woven together into what are, for those in the grip of a delusion, 
spectacular and hypersalient narratives. Importantly, such default 
thoughts “are subjectively adequate responses to experience con-
structed as narrative elements or fragments” [(3), p. 101].
The basic idea is that when operating in the default mode, we 
assemble first pass, coherent stories. Yet even when these stories are 
internally coherent, they are not always subjected to critical epis-
temic scrutiny. According to Gerrans (3) when unsupervised by 
decontextualized systems, the products of default thinking are not 
scrutinized for consistency or veridicality; they are not evaluated 
against “competing narratives for accuracy or utility” [(3), p. 77].
This is hardly surprising since the great bulk of narratives do not 
aim at truth. Although narratives all share certain basic structural 
properties, we must look to the contexts in which we use a given 
narrative in order to determine its semantic properties. Thus, as 
Goldie (24) points out “Fictional narratives do not aspire to be true, 
whereas real life narratives do. A narrative is fictional not in virtue 
of its content being false, but in virtue of its being narrated, and read 
or heard, as part of a practice of a special sort” (pp. 152–3, emphasis 
added). Thus fictional narratives, offered up as fictions, invite “the 
audience to imagine or make believe that what is being narrated 
actually happened, even when it is known that it did not. Thus the 
question of reference and of truth simply does not arise within the 
‘fictive stance’” [(24), pp. 152–3]. For these reasons, Goldie concludes 
that, “reference and truth have no application in fiction, but do have 
application in historical and everyday explanation” [(24), p. 154]. 
Different kinds of narratives exhibit different kinds of semantic 
18 When thinking about what might be leftover in such a subtraction, it is useful to 
consider Gerrans’s (3) claim that, “different cognitive processes have different com-
putational properties that enable them to meet their congruence condition. These 
properties provide the intentional structure of representations produced by different 
cognitive processes. For example, the representations produced by the visual system 
are 3D coloured scenes derived by processing spectral and luminance information” 
[(3), p. 105, emphases added]. However, once no correctness conditions are in play, 
it is not clear in what sense the residual structures ought to be thought to bear 
representational content or even what it means to say that they do (22).
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properties, and we understand these differences if we are alert to 
the roles that these different kinds of narratives play in our lives and 
thinking.
A crucial contrast becomes evident if we compare the uncritical 
use of narratives that do not aim at truth with the intense critical 
scrutiny of beliefs and claims that do. In the most serious cases, 
the latter are subject to the norms of scientific testing, where we 
seek to fix what we believe only “according to standards of consist-
ency and empirical adequacy” [(3), p. 13]. Put simply, some forms 
of cognition do have representational contents and do play roles 
in our cognitive economy that make them subject to epistemic 
norms which simply do not apply to other forms of cognition. 
Other forms of cognition lack these features. Our so-called default 
thoughts – those generated when our minds are wandering or in 
screensaver mode are a prime example. They do not involve any 
“attempt to confirm an empirical hypothesis” [(3), p. 76].
Although the above analysis only scratches the surface, the 
important thing to note is that the detailed explanations Gerrans 
(3) offers of the complexities of delusional thinking gain their 
power by focusing on the way diverse cognitive phenomena (e.g., 
feeling, imagining, and narrating) interact in virtue of their special 
cognitive roles and properties. Contrariwise, these explanations 
gain nothing from making the additional cognitivist assumption 
that all mental phenomena are united because they are, somehow, 
representational in character.
To tell a convincing explanatory story about minds and 
how they can become disturbed in particular ways, we need to 
recognize the important diversity of mental phenomena rather 
than insisting on a cognitivist account that downplays those dif-
ferences in favor of fulfilling a philosophically motivated demand 
for unity. We can relinquish CIT and its problematic intelligibility 
requirement, recasting the integrating cognitive theory in far less 
ideologically demanding ways than do the friends of cognitivist 
SI. This does not mean we should give up on understanding how 
various mental phenomena interact or that we should not seek to 
understand the roles they play in the larger cognitive economy. It 
simply means that we can make sense of the relevant interactions 
and relations between mental and other phenomena without 
insisting that informational and representational content are 
needed to account for the intelligibility of such relations.
Only if we fully free ourselves from the constraints of FP-based 
philosophical suppositions about what is necessary for something 
to count as a properly cognitive phenomena does it become possi-
ble to concoct accounts of cognition that are truly unconstrained 
by FP thinking about the basic nature of minds. Interestingly, 
radically enactivist approaches that lay stress on the importance 
of interactions over contentful representations as the common 
coin of the cognitive looks well placed to pick up the explanatory 
burden (10). This is especially so if it is accepted that “what needs 
to be explained here is not just the causal interactions among 
neurons but the way those interactions enable cognitive processes 
and experiences” [(3), p. 30].19
19 Enactivists, of course, encourage multi-stranded investigations, involving expla-
nations that are pitched at various “levels” and “scales.” Gerrans (3) acknowledges 
this. Taking the case of vision as a prime example, he emphasizes the need for 
theories that seek to simultaneously investigate different levels of cognitive activity 
KeePing FP in The PicTUre
Only once the siren songs of an exclusively brain-focused future 
vision for psychiatry are silenced can the ground for a suitably 
open-minded and philosophically uncontaminated rendering of 
the SI view be laid. This closing section shows that when modestly 
formulated in the way suggested above, the SI view can make 
peace with an unimperialistic vision of FP.
Consider, once again, Gerrans’s (3) plausible suggestion that 
narrative-based and theory-based explanations differ in impor-
tant ways because they answer to different epistemic standards. 
Thus, to understand the delusional mind requires understand-
ing how these modes of cognition interact or fail to interact in 
particular conditions.
Let us assume that Gerrans’s (3) answer is along the right lines. 
Let us assume, for example, that those under the sway of specific 
delusions do indeed construct stories as opposed to rationally 
evaluated beliefs in order to make sense of such episodes. We 
might wonder, assuming they are not natural-born narrators, 
how they come to be able to weave such stories? We might be 
interested to know why a given kind or genre of story rather than 
another is more compelling to some populations rather than 
another? Or, why – upon experiencing an underlying mismatch 
between what-is-felt and what-was- anticipated-would have-and-
should-have-been-felt – the narratives of deluded people unfold 
in one standard variant rather than another. The thing to notice is 
that in order to explain and understand key features of delusional 
narratives and the narrative practices that enable their generation 
requires looking at socioculturally and not purely neural factors 
[for extended arguments along these lines, see (23, 25–27)]. This 
is especially the case when it comes to understanding the distinc-
tive kinds of norms relevant to the sorts of cognitive activity that 
differentiate narrative from scientific practices.
The point is that understanding the relevant norms requires 
looking beyond the brain (27). Only outside the skull of individuals 
do we find what we need for making sense of normative features of 
the cognitive phenomena that need explaining. Yet it is also when 
we look to certain public practices that we come by the resources 
for adopting a softer take on FP and its role in therapy. Certain 
kinds of treatment urge us to make best use of tools already avail-
able within cultures – such as incorporating traditional narrative 
practices into therapy – in order to respond to those in need.
There are compelling reasons to agree with Gerrans (3) that 
our foremost ways of making sense of ourselves and others are 
grounded in explanations that are not theoretical but narratively 
based. Such explanations function, primarily, as normalizing 
explanations. In giving them, any of a number of explanatorily 
relevant factors might be cited (e.g., facets of X’s character, X’s 
mood, X’s larger projects, the content of this or that propositional 
attitude of X, and so on). Crucially, like historical explanations, 
these folk psychological explanations are not general and abstract 
but take the form of narratives that emphasize details that are 
personal and particular.
and how they integrate. Yet here he notes, “Even enactive theorists of vision who 
disagree with Marrians nonetheless debate with them about the causal relevance 
of mechanisms at different levels” [(3), p. 43].
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Consider an idealized test case. Imagine a person suffering 
from a psychiatric condition that is brought on by a cascade of 
factors rooted in neural causes. Imagine that the condition can 
be wholly and successfully addressed by a perfectly targeted 
neuroscientific intervention. Even in this imagined case – one 
that best favors a purely neurocentric vision of psychiatry in 
terms of diagnosis explanation, and treatment – it is plausible 
there would be a need for the person to achieve a rehabilitat-
ing self-understanding. Graham (1) captures this point when 
he says:
to mend or heal from a disorder in a self-respecting 
and dignified manner requires discovering a positive 
or purposeful place for past and present episodes of 
disorder in the … course of a person’s life … [this] often 
consists of dealing with conflicting interpretations of 
one’s past … [(1), p. 14].
The take-home lesson is that even in ideal cases in which tar-
geted neural inventions might wholly relieve specific conditions 
we should not typically expect psychiatric therapy to boil down 
to a simple business of eradicating “disease” in the way a narrowly 
construed medical model can suggest.
Murphy (2) appears prepared to acknowledge that there is a 
need for psychiatry to go beyond the brain, at least in some cases. 
In this vein, he states clearly that, “there are important roles for non-
scientific thinking about the methods of psychiatry” [(2), p. 47].20
Importantly, even for those who press for a more thorough 
brain-based vision of psychiatry, there need be no conflict 
between endorsing both an SI view of the field and recognizing 
the need and importance of non-scientifically focused thera-
pies.21 When it comes to therapy, a cautious pluralism seems to be 
the appropriate stance: it appears we need a variety of approaches 
if we are to improve the situation of individuals. Individual 
therapeutic requirements need to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis. What matters is that a pluralist approach is always pos-
sible – and typically desirable – when it comes to treatment. As 
Murphy (2) rightly stresses, “Even if we have established that a 
symptom is best explained in terms of one main causal factor, 
such as neurotransmitter abnormality, it does not follow that 
treatment must be directed at directly manipulating that causal 
factor” [(2), p. 369].
This is all well and good, but Murphy (2) is almost completely 
silent about which non-scientific approaches and forms to 
20 Crucially, however, Murphy (2) insists that it is important to “distinguish between 
supplementing and replacing the medical model” (p. 367).
21 Narrative therapy is, for example, neither scientifically focused nor scientifically 
based. It uses special techniques in order to provide the tools for empowering 
people, enabling them to exercise their agency in wider and more positive ways. 
Narrative therapy, although very much in the mould of “talking cures,” is thus 
unlike more familiar psychoanalytic approaches to therapy in that it does not seek 
to divine and understand past causes of current trauma. Nevertheless, there seems 
no reason to discount narrative therapy as a bone fide therapy given that it is has 
been used successfully to help people deal better with a wide range of psychiatric 
and traumatic conditions, including asthma, anorexia, bulimia, and depression.
therapy might be usefully brought to bear. And it is here that 
folk psychological narrative practices are likely to play a central 
role. This is because narratives are the familiar, everyday medium 
through which most of us readily evaluate and reflect upon our 
reasons, attitudes, and situations (24). Reviewing and recasting 
our narratives, with the assistance of others, is not only a way 
of making sense of our lives in new and fresh ways it can open 
up possibilities for living them differently22. Narrative practices 
afford such new possibilities precisely because they provide a 
means for thinking afresh about “who we are” based on richer 
understandings of our peculiar situations by revisiting our pos-
sible pasts and reimagining our possible futures.
Understanding FP as a kind of narrative practice in this way 
connects perfectly with the ambitions of narratively based thera-
pies that seek to use so-called “talking cures” to empower people 
in the construction of a viable “future trajectory rather than 
achieving past accuracy” [(1), p. 14]. FP, as a special kind of nar-
rative practice, is a possible object of philosophical and scientific 
study in a way that is wholly compatible with the modest render-
ing of the SI view argued for in the previous section. The views are 
compatible because FP, construed as a narrative practice, is not 
to be understood as a general theory embedded in that practice 
from which a philosophically discernable mark of the mental that 
defined mental disorders is to be sourced.23
cOnclUsiOn
There are excellent reasons to resist a forced choice between 
standard format FP and SI views of psychiatry. On the one hand, 
in its original variant, the FP view attempts to provide a defini-
tive mark of all that is properly mental, which is imperialistic 
and isolationist. On the other hand, the SI view, at least when 
formulated in its popular cognitivist version, is unjustifiably 
and potentially unhelpfully overly narrow and neurocentric. 
Consequently, adopting either of these views of psychiatry in 
their standard forms threatens to leave us with an ideological 
vision of psychiatry’s future that is too extreme and too limited. 
A better way forward is to salvage what is best from heavily edited 
versions of the familiar versions of the FP and SI views on the 
market, combining what remains to best effect.
Ultimately, the arguments presented here have been pitched 
at a quite general level, whereas to make good on this plan for 
reconciliation in a wholly convincing manner requires more 
detailed philosophical work on case studies in ways, which it 
22 Hutto DD, Gallagher S. Re-authoring narrative therapy: opening the way for 
future developments. Philos Psychiatr Psychol (Forthcoming).
23 Whether FP should be understood as a narrative practice as opposed to, and 
distinct from, a theory of mind remains a controversial matter of dispute in the 
literature. It would take too much space to attempt to settle the issue or detail all 
the consequences of going one way rather than the other, in this paper. Extended 
arguments for treating FP as a narrative practice that does not reduce to theory 
can be found in Ref. (23, 25–28, Hutto DD, McGivern P. Updating the story of 
mental time travel: narrating and engaging with our possible pasts and futures. 
In: Altshuler R, Sigrist MJ, editors. Time and the Philosophy of Action. London: 
Routledge (Forthcoming)).
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has not been possible to provide in this paper. But if the above 
arguments are sound, then the ambitions of this paper will have 
been realized and the ground will have been laid for those future, 
follow-up endeavors.
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